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ABSTRACT 
The overall goal of our paper is to better understand the development of groundwater 
markets in northern China.  In particular, we focus on the factors that determine the 
development of groundwater markets in our attempt to explain their ‘breadth’ and ‘depth.’  
Based on a survey of 24 randomly sampled villages and 50 randomly sampled tubewells in 
two provinces (Hebei and Henan Province) in 2001 and a field survey of 68 randomly 
sampled villages in 4 provinces (Hebei, Henan, Shanxi, and Shaanxi) of northern China in 
2004, our results show that groundwater markets in northern China have emerged and are 
developing rapidly.  Our results show that groundwater markets in northern China are 
informal and localized.  The markets have developed in a way in which they appear 
somewhat similar to markets that are found in South Asia.  However, groundwater markets 
differ from markets in South Asia in other ways—water sellers discriminate in pricing and 
they almost always work on a spot-market, cash basis (that is, there are no share or labor 
sharing arrangements as found in South Asia).  Econometric results show that the 
privatization of tubewells is one of the most important driving factors that encourage the 
development of groundwater markets.  Increasing water and land scarcity are also major 
determinants that induce the development of groundwater markets. 
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As the reliance on groundwater has increased, China’s groundwater economy has 
become characterized by a growing water crisis (Wang et al., 2005a).  With falling 
groundwater table, the ownership of tubewells also has been evolving from collective to 
private.  While the rise of private tubewells has been shown to lead to more efficient use of 
water, higher levels of irrigated area and more complex cropping systems (Wang et al., 
2005b), it has also made access to irrigation water an increasingly important issue.  The rise 
of private tubewells, however, does not have to lead to inequities if groundwater markets 
emerge and function well.  Despite the potential importance of groundwater markets, there 
is almost no reference in any work on groundwater markets in China in either Chinese or 
English.  The overall goal of our paper is to understand the development and determinants 
of groundwater markets in northern China. 
While there is no generally accepted definition of groundwater markets in the 
literature, in our paper groundwater markets are defined as localized, village-level 
arrangements through which owners of tubewells sell pump irrigation services to other 
farmers of the village (i.e., they sell water to other farmers from their wells for use on crops).  
In our paper, we are only going to examine “private” water markets.  In other words, we 
examine the nature of groundwater markets that are being driven by individuals and groups of 
individuals that sink wells.  In making such a definition, we are assuming that when village 
leaders (the collective) provide water to villagers, this is being done under non-market 
conditions. 
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Data 
Our analysis is based on data that we collected as part of two recent surveys 
specifically designed to examine irrigation practices and agricultural water management 
issues in northern China.1  The first survey, the China Water Institutions and Management 
survey (CWIM), was conducted in September 2004.  Enumerators conducted surveys of 
village leaders in 24 villages having non-collective tubewells and 50 non-collective tubewells 
owners in the selected 24 villages in Hebei and Henan Provinces.  The study team also 
conducted a second survey, the North China Water Resource Survey (NCWRS), in December 
2004 and January 2005.  This survey of village leaders from 400 regionally-representative 
villages in Inner Mongolia, Hebei, Henan, Liaoning, Shaanxi and Shanxi provinces used an 
extended version of the community level village instrument of the CWIM survey.   
The scopes of two surveys were quite broad.  Each of the survey questionnaires 
included more than 10 sections.  Among the sections, there were those that focused on the 
village’s resource base (both the scarcity of water and the amount of cultivated land), the 
evolution of the ownership of tubewells, the village’s basic socio-economic conditions and 
government policies and regulations.2  In addition, there was a section that focused 
specifically on groundwater markets.  For example, we asked village leaders if there are 
tubewell owners that sell water to farm households that do not own tubewells, the number of 
                                                        
1 In our study, northern China can be thought to include the following regions: northern China (huabei), 
Northeast China (dongbei) and Northwest China (xibei). 
2 Private tubewells consist of two types of tubewells—individual and shareholding tubewells.  If a tubewell 
belongs to a single individual or family, we call it an individual tubewell.  In many cases, however, a tubewell 
is owned by groups of individuals.  Since in many of the groups the individual members are assigned shares 
that indicate the investment stake that each member has in the tubewell, the groups are often called shareholding 
groups and their tubewells are called shareholding tubewells. 
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tubewells in a village from which water was sold by its owner and detailed information on the 
water sales activities of the village’s typical well.  Both surveys were designed in ways that 
allowed the construction of data with an inter-temporal component.  The surveys collected 
data on many variables for more than two years.  For example, the CWIM survey covered 
four periods: 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2004.  The NCWRS survey covered 1995 and 2004. 
 
Groundwater Markets with Chinese Characteristics 
In this section we measure the degree of the development of groundwater markets in 
terms of both breadth and depth as well as describe their characteristics.  The breadth of 
groundwater markets is measured by two indicators.  One indicator is the share of villages 
that have any degree of groundwater market activity.  The second indicator is the share of 
tubewells from which the tubewell owner is selling water to water-buying households.  
Depth is measured by the share of the volume of water sold to water-buying households.  
When using breadth indicators, groundwater markets have developed quickly in 
northern China.  According to the NCWRS survey, in 1995 groundwater markets had 
emerged in only 9 percent of the sample villages (Table 1, column 1, row 1).  However, by 
2004 there were groundwater markets in 44 percent of the villages (column 2).  During the 
same period, the share of tubewells from which owners sold water also increased.  In 1995 
water was sold from only 5 percent of tubewells; by 2004, however, this number increased to 
18 percent (row 2).  In addition, when using indicators of the depth of groundwater markets, 
the CWIM survey shows that by 2004, groundwater market activities were dominating the 
tubewell pumping activities of those farmers that were selling water (row 3). 
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Characteristics of Groundwater Markets in Northern China 
Although groundwater markets in northern China have evolved more recently, there 
are at least three characteristics in which it appears as if groundwater markets in northern 
China share with those in South Asia.  First, almost all groundwater markets in both places 
are informal.  According to Shah (1993), a water market is informal where transactions 
between water-selling and water-buying households are done without legal sanction.  
Second, groundwater markets in both northern China and South Asia are almost always 
localized (that is, water sales are made to fellow villagers).  Finally, groundwater markets in 
both northern China and South Asia are largely unregulated.  In Shah (1993), unregulated 
means the government exercises no direct influence on the functioning of the market.  
While there are a number of similarities, it appears as if the different environments 
within which groundwater markets have evolved in northern China and South Asia have 
produced at least two differences in the nature of the groundwater markets.  First, Shah 
(1993) suggests that transactions between water-buying and water-selling households are 
typically impersonal.  In contrast, in the case of northern China groundwater markets are not 
fully impersonal.  According to our 2004 NCWRS survey, 73 percent of water-selling 
tubewell owners charge different prices for different types of buyers; in other words, there 
was not a single price for a relative, neighbor or lease of cultivated land.  Second, the 
patterns of payment of groundwater markets are different.  In South Asia, for example, 
water-buying households often provide labor or a share of their crop’s harvest in exchange for 
water (Shah, 1998).  In northern China, however, water sold in groundwater markets are 
almost always paid for on a cash basis. 
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 Determinants of Groundwater Markets 
According to descriptive statistics based on our data from northern China, we find that 
groundwater markets are not randomly assigned but appear to emerge in areas bases on the 
existing resource scarcities and institutional structures.  We find that the development of 
groundwater markets is related (in a descriptive sense) with water resource scarcity (Tables 2 
and 3).  For example, when the water table falls in the NCWRS sample villages over time 
(from 28 to 38 meters—Table 2, column 3), the share of tubewells from which water is being 
sold is higher (columns 1).  Likewise, when we divide the tubewells in the sample by the 
share of tubewells from which water is sold in four groups (column 1, rows 3 to 6), there is a 
positive correlation between the amount of groundwater activity and level of the groundwater 
table.  Likewise, our data trace similar pattern between groundwater market activity and 
land scarcity (Table 2, columns 1 and 4; Table 3, columns 1 and 5). 
Beyond resource scarcity, our data demonstrate that the development of groundwater 
market activity is correlated with the private ownership of tubewells (Tables 2 and 3).  For 
example, groundwater market activity is higher as the share of private wells has risen over 
time (from 50 to 81 percent—Table 2, columns 1 and 4, rows 1 and 2).  Likewise, when our 
observations are grouped according to the water sales activity of the tubewells, the share of 
private wells in 2004 also rises sharply (from 68 to 100 percent—rows 3 to 6).   
Methodology 
Based on the descriptive analysis above and work on groundwater markets in other 
countries, we propose the following econometric model to analyze the determinants of 
breadth of groundwater markets: 
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jtjtjtjtjtjt ZLWOT εφδγβα +++++= .       (1) 
In equation (1), represents the share of tubewells selling water in village j in year t.  The 
variables on the right hand side of equation (1) are those that explain differences in the 
breadth of groundwater markets (or the share of tubewells that sell water) among village and 
over time.  The first variable, O
jtT
 jt, represents the change of tubewell ownership and is 
measured as the share of private tubewells in village j.  The two variables, Wjt and Ljt, 
measure the resource endowments of the village (both its water and land resources) and are 
included to identify if increasing resource scarcity (or cost of using the resource) helps induce 
the development of groundwater markets.  Specifically, the water resources variable (Wjt) is 
measured as the level of groundwater table.  The degree of land scarcity (Ljt) is measured as 
cultivated land per capita.  
In equation (1) we also include a set of control variables.  The first set of control 
variables includes a set of three policy variables (fiscal subsidies for tubewells, bank loans for 
tubewells and well-drilling regulations) which are included to assess the effects of policy on 
the development of groundwater markets.  We also control for several other factors, such as 
the adoption of irrigation water conveyance technologies and village income per capita.  The 
symbolsα , β ,γ ,δ and φ  are parameters to be estimated and jtε  is the error term. 
In order to analyze the determinants of development of the depth of groundwater 
markets, we specify the following econometric model:  
jjjjjj ZLWOM εφδγβα +++++=        (2) 
where represents the share of water sold for tubewell j.  While the basic structure of 
equation (2) is the same as equation (1), because of the nature of the dependent variable (and 
jM
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differences in the sample—the breadth of water markets analysis uses village-level data; and 
the depth of water markets analysis uses tubewell-level data), the specification is slightly 
modified.  The first variable, O j, represents the ownership of tubewell j, if the tubewell is 
owned by an individual (a single family), it equals to 1; otherwise, the tubewell is owned by 
group of individuals and equals to 0.  The relative scarcity of water and land might also be 
expected to affect the amount of water sold to other farmers.  To control for water scarcity, 
we include the variable Wj which is measured by the depth of the groundwater table.  We 
need to be concerned about the endogeneity of such a variable since the development of 
groundwater markets may influence the level of the groundwater table.  Consequently, in 
our analysis we measure Wj as the groundwater table of the village in 1995, a time before our 
sample and a year in a time period before the takeoff of groundwater markets.  In the same 
spirit, we inlude a variable, Lj, in order to control for the the degree of land scarcity (which 
we measure as cultivated land per capita in the village in which tubewell j is located).  In 
equation (2), as in equation (1), we also include a set of 3 policy and the control variables.   
Results 
When estimating the determinants of development breath and depth of groundwater 
markets, we use a Tobit model.  This estimation strategy is needed since the dependent 
variables in both equation (1) and (2) are in “share” form (that is, between 0 and 1).  There 
are also a number of villages (tubewells) in which the value of the dependent variable is zero.  
Using Ordinary Least Squares Approach (OLS) would produce bias in our estimates. 
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Determinants of Development Breadth of Groundwater Markets     
In estimating equations (1) with our data, our econometric estimation performs well 
(Table 4, column 1).  Most of coefficients of the control variables have the expected signs 
and a number of the coefficients are statistically significant.  For example, the coefficient of 
well-drilling permission regulation variable is negative and statistically significant (column 1, 
row 8).   
More importantly, when examining our variables of interest, our results show that the 
change of tubewell ownership from collective to non-collective induces the development of 
groundwater markets.  The coefficient on the share of non-collective tubewells variable is 
positive and significant (Table 4, row 1).  All other things held constant, when the share of 
non-collective tubewells in a village increases, the share of tubewells selling water increases. 
Resource scarcity also is associated with the emergence of groundwater markets.  
Although it could have been that deeper water tables mean higher water prices and less 
demand, in fact, the coefficient on the depth to groundwater table is positive and significant 
(Table 4, row 3).  Our results also show that land pressure has increased the development 
breadth of groundwater markets.  The coefficient on the per capita arable land variable is 
negative and statistically significant (row 4).  In other words, our results imply that with 
decrease of per capita land resources, the share of tubewells selling water has increased. 
Determinants of Development Depth of Groundwater Markets 
Our econometric estimation also performs well when estimating the depth of 
groundwater markets (Table 4, column 2).  The Chi-square is 46, higher than those above 
 8
explaining the breadth of groundwater markets.  Similarly, most of coefficients of control 
variables have the expected signs and a number of the coefficients are statistically significant.   
In addition, similar to the regression results on the determinants of the development of 
the breadth of groundwater markets, the development of the depth of groundwater markets 
are also significantly associated with tubewell ownership and water and land scarcity.  For 
example, the coefficient on the dummy variable of individual tubewell is positive and 
significant (Table 4, row 2).  This means that compared with shareholding tubewells, 
individual tubewells sell more water.  The coefficients on the depth of the groundwater table 
and the per capita arable land variables are significant regardless of the specification (rows 4 
and 5).  Hence, it appears as if when the groundwater table is deeper (and tubewells need to 
be larger and more expensive to sink) and agricultural land is more scarce (making it less 
desirable for an individual farmer to sink his/her own tubewell), the average tubewell 
operator sells a greater share of water from his/her tubewell.   
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have sought to understand the development of groundwater markets 
in northern China and examine the factors that determine the development of groundwater 
markets.  Using data that we collected ourselves, our findings provide strong evidence that 
groundwater markets in northern China have developed in terms of both their breadth (the 
share of villages in which there are groundwater market activity) and depth (the share of 
water which the average tubewell owner sells to others on a market basis).  Interestingly, 
although fewer people have worked on groundwater markets in China, even compared to 
countries, such as India and Pakistan, which have better documented groundwater markets, 
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groundwater markets in northern China clearly have emerged and are almost equal in 
pervasiveness.  Although we find that groundwater markets in northern China have some 
characteristics similar to those in South Asia (e.g., markets are informal, localized and mostly 
unregulated), they differ in other ways.  Groundwater markets in northern China appear to 
be done more on a cash basis and are not fully impersonal. 
While our multivariate analysis is carried out mostly to understand descriptively the 
correlates of groundwater markets, we have a number of robust findings.  The form of 
ownership appears to be correlated with the emergence of groundwater markets.  
Groundwater markets also appear in more villages and tubewell owners sell a higher share of 
the water from their wells when the groundwater table is deep and land is scarce.  All of 
these are suggest that when the factors that affect supply and demand for groundwater are in 
place, there is a tendency for markets to emerge.   
While much of our results are suggestive that groundwater markets are largely self- 
organizing and unregulated, there also does appear to be a role for the state.  Our findings 
show that when the government makes it easier for individuals and shareholding groups to 
get access to capital and are not subject to local regulations, there is greater level of 
groundwater market activity.  Since our results (not shown here for brevity sake) also show 
that groundwater markets at the very least are not regressive and may, in some cases, be 
progressive, it may be that government-sponsored investment and banking programs that 
allow individuals access to grants and loans to sink tubewell will further promote 
groundwater markets with Chinese characteristics.   
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 Table 1  Development breadth of groundwater markets in different period 
Year 1995 2004 
Breadth   
Share of villages having groundwater markets(%) 9 44 
Share of tubewells selling water(%) 5 18 
Depth   
    Share of water sold (%) 80 77 
Data source: Data in row 1 and row 2 are from authors’ survey in 68 randomly selected villages in 4 provinces of 
NCWRS; Data in row 3 are from authors’ survey in 50 randomly selected tubewells in 2 
provinces of CWIM.   
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 Table 2  Relationship between development breadth of groundwater markets and tubewell ownership  
and resource endowment 
  
Tubewells  
owenership 
Water  
scarcity 
 
Land  
scarcity 
Share of tubewells Share of private Groundwater  Per capita 
 selling water tubewells  Table  arable land 
     
 
      
  (%) （%） (meter)  (ha) 
Grouped by yeara      
1995 5 50 28  0.12  
2004 18 81 38  0.10  
      
Grouped by share of tubewell selling waterb     
0 0 68 28  0.11  
0-30 12 46 45  0.12  
30-90 57 70 48  0.11  
90-100 100 100 48  0.09  
a The number of observations used for each row in rows 1 and 2 is 68. 
b The number of observations used for each row in rows 3 to 6 is n=100(row 3); n=10(row 4);n=8(row 5); 
 And n=18(row 6). Data are averages for two sample years. 
Data source: Authors’ survey in 68 randomly selected villages in 4 provinces of NCWRS. 
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 Table 3  Relationship between development depth of groundwater markets and tubewell ownership and resource
endowment 
  
Tubewells  
owenership 
Water  
scarcity 
 
Land  
Scarcity 
Share of  Share of  Share of  Groundwater  Per capita 
water sold individual shareholding table in 1995  arable land 
 tubewells tubewells    
 
       
  (%) （%） (%) (meter)  (ha) 
Grouped by Share of Water solda     
0 0 19 81 13.6  0.120  
0-90 48 44 56 11.1  0.091  
90-100 97 100 0 17.6  0.089  
a The number of observations used for each row in rows 1 to 3 is n=32(row 1);n=9(row 2);and n=9(row 3). 
Data source: Authors’ survey in 68 randomly selected villages in 4 provinces of CNWRS. 
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 Table 4  Regression analysis of the determinants of development breadth and depth of groundwater markets (Tobit)
 Share of tubewells selling water Share of water sold 
Tubewell ownership   
  Share of private tubewells 1.733  
 (3.28)***  
  Dummy of individual tubewell  0.389 
  (4.33)*** 
Water and land scarcity   
  Log of groundwater table 1.065  
   (3.17)***  
Log of groundwater table in 1995  0.105 
  (2.01)** 
  Log of per capita arable land -1.022 -0.522 
 (2.29)** (3.50)*** 
Policy interventions   
  Dummy of fiscal subsidies for tubewell investment  0.646 -0.121 
 -0.68 -1.58 
  Dummy of bank loans for tubewell investment  0.488 0.484 
 -0.56 (3.02)*** 
  Dummy of well-drilling permission regulation 1.429 0.045 
 (2.75)*** -0.46 
Other control variables   
  Dummy of adoption of water conveying pipe -0.241 -0.093 
 -0.65 -0.94 
  Per capita net income of farmers -0.006 0.196 
 -0.02 (1.94)* 
Constant -8.844 -2.943 
 (3.18)*** (3.34)*** 
Observations 136 50 
Chi-square 18.07 46.37 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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